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Background
This report summarises presentations and discussion at a conference on ‘New Cycles of
Disadvantage’ organised by CASE on behalf of the Economic and Social Research Council
for the Treasury and other central government departments. It took place at Stoke Rochford
Hall near Grantham on 27-28 November 1997. The organisers are very grateful to all
participants for their contributions to the debate summarised here. A list of participants is
included as Annex A. References and further reading relating to presentations are listed as
Annex B
ESRC decided to hold this conference to help broaden Treasury links with sociologists and
social policy specialists. The theme was a revisiting in the light of new evidence of the idea
of ‘cycles of deprivation’ which was the subject of a major initiative (on transmitted
deprivation) by the then SSRC and DHSS in the 1970s, following a major speech on the
subject by Sir Keith Joseph. He was intrigued by the contrast between an increase in living
standards co-existing with the existence of a group of people who were in poverty and
underachieving and re-creating itself. The conference was introduced by Professor Michael
Rutter, who was involved in the original SSRC/DHSS initiative, including a review of
research, Cycles of Disadvantage: A Review of Research (Rutter and Madge, 1976).
1. Introductory Lecture: New Cycles of Disadvantage
Professor Sir Michael Rutter
(Professor of Child Psychiatry and Honorary Director of the Medical
Research Council Child Psychiatry Unit)
Recent evidence on intergenerational continuities
1) There is substantial familial continuity for many problem behaviours (e.g. crime, mild
mental retardation). The example used below is anti-social behaviour.
2) However, continuity is evident in areas, as well as in ethnic and other groups. So
continuity should not be seen simply in familial/individual terms.
3) There is also substantial discontinuity across generations.
4) We are dealing with multiple mediating mechanisms.
5) Factors responsible for individual differences are not necessarily the same as those
responsible for differences in the level of continuity, i.e. why have crime rates and
suicide rates gone up over the last 50 years? We shouldn’t assume that the explanations
for these two phenomena are the same.
Example: David Farrington’s study of inner London boroughs (1996)
Parent convicted: Parent not
convicted:
Odds Ratio:
% of sons convicted 61 28 4.0
Mother convicted: Mother not
convicted:
Odds Ratio:
% of fathers
convicted
61 23 5.9
Wife convicted: Wife not convicted: Odds Ratio:
% of husbands
convicted
83 35 9.3
These links show that there is something other than genetic transmission going on.
Mediating mechanisms for continuities and discontinuities:
1) There is good evidence for genetic influences on individual differences in anti-social
and other behaviour. These are unlikely to operate directly in relation to crime: rather it
is probable that they are concerned with risk characteristics such as hyperactivity and
impulsivity. During the past twenty years it has also become clear that genetic factors
may operate indirectly through influences on nurture: nurture interplay.
22) Indirect genetic effects: both as a result of gene-environment correlation and through
gene-environment interactions.
3) Environmentally mediated family influences.
4) Peer group influences: the importance of environmentally mediated influences outside
the family (i.e. peer groups) is growing. Young people with a certain behaviour find
and associate with each other. Longitudinal studies suggest that this has causal effects
on behaviour.
5) School influences. Many studies have not looked at anti-social behaviour. But Michael
Rutter’s own study did find evidence of the impact of the school environment upon
behaviour.
6) Area influences in anti-social behaviour. It is difficult to define what this means and to
determine if there is any influence outside or separate from family influences. Evidence
suggests that there are area influences.
Genetic evidence on heterogeneity of anti-social behaviour
Studies of twins by Silberg and others suggest that genetic and environmental effects on
behaviour vary between kinds of behaviour:
• Multiple problematic behaviour: genes dominates
• Pure conduct disorder: environment dominates and genes have little effect.
Studies suggest that conduct problems in childhood and adolescence show very little gene
influence. In adulthood, genetic factors come into play when problems persist in
adulthood. There are strong continuities but patterns of influences are quite different.
However, the parents passing on genes are the same people responsible for providing the
environment in which children grow up, so the two are linked.
Maughan et al (1995) identified a ‘high risk group’ – a sample of families in which one or
both parents had some kind of mental health problem – and a ‘community group’ –
families from the same area as the other group. More children in the high-risk group were
exposed to maternal or paternal hostility. Parents with problems create high risk
environments.
Ge at al (1996) discussed how parents influence children and how far children influence
parents – the influence goes both ways.
Anderson et al (1986) studied dyads of mothers with their own and with someone else’s
child. Two way effects were evident. Children with conduct problems elicited more
negative responses from mothers (their own and other people’s) but the mothers of
children with conduct disorder tended to be more negative than other mothers, even when
interacting with a normal child.
Bohman (1995) looked at petty criminality in adult life using data on male adoptees. The
researcher identifies ‘rearing risk’ as adoptive parents display anti-social behaviour, or
‘biological risk’, showing the following interaction:
No risk factor – 3% criminality
Rearing risk only – 6% criminality
3Biological risk only – 12% criminality
Both factors – 40% criminality
Cadoret (1995) looked at the interaction between anti-social personality disorder,
biological parents and adverse adoptive home environment. Genetic factors act differently
within different environments.
Ethnicity
Smith (1997) shows major differences in imprisonment rates between ethnic groups. Rates
for the population of South Asian origin are the same as or below whites, but rates for the
black population are much worse than for whites (6.5 times for 17-19 year-olds; 5.5 times
for 20-39 year-olds). The differences in the USA are much greater. Black children are
much more likely than white children to be raised by single parents or separated parents.
Asian children are less likely than whites to be raised by single parents. There are
substantial differences in highest qualification gained between first and second-generation
immigrants. Non-qualification rates are falling for the Caribbean/Indian population, but are
rising for the Pakistani population.
There is now an important proportion of the population with mixed parentage. Modood et
al (1997) looked at Caribbean people and the proportion of their partners that are white
according to those born in the UK and those born abroad. Of those born in the UK:
- one third of women have white partners
- one half of men have white partners
The proportions are much lower in the Asian community – almost 40% of ‘black’ children
have one white parent, but hardly any Asian children have one white parent.
Environmental continuities
Quinton and Rutter (1988) suggest the following framework for the intergenerational
transmission of parenting breakdown:
4Breakdown in parenting
Institutional rearing
Return to discordant family in adolescence
Teenage pregnancy
Marital breakdown
Marriage ‘to escape’ or under pressure
Un-supportive or deviant spouse
Poor social functioning as adult
Parenting breakdown
How do continuities and discontinuities come about?
The following figure shows the influences on whether women end up with a deviant
partner:
- if they have a conduct disorder then they have a high chance
- if they come from a discordant home in adolescence they have a higher chance
- if they are a ‘planner of life’ they have less chance
- if they are a ‘non-planner’ they have a higher chance
- if they have deviant peers then they have a higher chance
As the diagram shows, each of these has a separate effect, controlling for the others, and
that different factors interact. Someone is much more likely to be in a deviant peer group if
they display deviant behaviour. At each point there are important discontinuities. The
proportion of overall variance explained by deviant peers is quite small, but the impact on
individuals is high.
Fergusson et al (1992) looked at the chance of offending linked to family change and
family discord, finding that family discord as more important (but change made family
discord more likely.
Rutter et al (1997) looked at the effect of having a non-deviant partner on people who were
deviants in childhood. For those with support from a non-deviant partner, delinquency
rates fall with age (compared to a slow rise for those without such support). As a general
implication, major changes follow major changes in environment.
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6Area influences on violence
Sampson et al (1997) looked at the major effect of lack of collective efficacy (reflected in
the sense of social cohesion, trust and informal social control) on violence, the most
sophisticated study of this kind. They found associations between neighbourhood
variations in three factors (themselves linked):
• concentrated disadvantage
• immigrant concentration
• residential instability, and
• violent victimisation
• homicides
There were marked area effects.
Crime and inequalities 1961 – 1989
It is important not to take too simplistic a view of the links between crime and inequalities.
Looking at the period 1961-1989, Farrington (1992) shows a marked, steep and continuous
rise in the rates of disorder amongst young people. Over the same period income
inequalities fall between 1964 and 1977 and then rise rapidly in the 1980s (JRF, 1995).
Crime rose at the same rate during periods of falling and rising inequality. In some ways
this is surprising as, for instance, links between inequality and health are stronger.
Discussion
• The issue was raised of whether one influence on crime came from geographical
effects, where differences increased earlier than the rise in income inequality. Professor
Rutter pointed to rising crime in rural areas as a counter-example, but another academic
participant disagreed that the rise in crime has been as great in rural areas as in inner city
areas. The gross crime rate measures shown aggregate a number of phenomena. Crime
rates measure crude rates of victimisation and rates of offending. The rural urban
dichotomy is crude. He cautioned against making inferences from graphs showing no
correlation between gross crime rates and increases in inequality. Professor Rutter said that
the true explanation remains a puzzle. There is an undeniable increase in crime and,
although it has been exaggerated by some methodologies, it is a real increase.
• What distinguishes those who ‘buck the odds’ and what are the characteristics of
those who don’t go the way the probabilities suggest they will go? Professor Rutter replied
that this is not determined by random variation – positive school experience was important,
7not necessarily academic success, but success in sports and positions of responsibility is
important for the high-risk group. If you come from a positive background, another
positive experience does not make a difference. If you are from a poor background, one
good experience could make a difference.
• What policy conclusions should be drawn from the research and where should
policy intervene for maximum input? Will the general improvement in the economic
climate have less impact than much smaller environmental influences, such as having a
good partner? Professor Rutter thought that whatever level of influences there are,
something can be done – at school level, community level and family level. It is not helpful
to say which is more important, as they interact. Interventions that cut across all will
probably be more effective.
• Another participant stressed the importance of the role of institutions, such as
schools, workplaces and other agencies dealing with young people. He suggested there was
a need for harmony between parental aspirations and a supportive school environment.
Many disadvantaged children did succeed in adulthood. He thought that the institutional
factor was missing from some of the research. Professor Rutter agreed that schools are
important, and that the work environment had not been looked at very much, despite its
importance. The workplace has been looked at in studies on physical health. Work is an
important influence on peoples’ expectations and on anticipations of life. The loss of job
has an impact, but so does the anticipation of losing a job.
• To what extent is there consensus behind the findings shown? Professor Rutter said
that the broad message was empirically supported, and difficult to argue against, although
some were concerned about biological determinism. It should be remembered that genetic
factors worked in a probabilistic way, like environmental ones. The evidence was clear –
looking at continuities, one has to look outside the family. Also, the answer one gets when
looking cross-sectionally is different from effects over time. The reasons for this are
puzzling. The challenge for social scientists is to take the anomalies in empirical findings
and find the answers for them – however uncomfortable they may be.
• Are there differences between the increases in crime, violent crime and anti-social
behaviour? Professor Rutter said that violent crime probably went up more, although there
is variation from country to country. There has been some increase in anti-social
behaviour, but the evidence is less clear.
8Income mobility and poverty dynamics
Professor Stephen Jenkins
(ESRC Research Centre on Microsocial Change, University of Essex)
The presentation continued on the theme of continuities – although rather than looking at
intergenerational changes, the Essex researchers have been looking at what happens from
one year to the next. The Transmitted Deprivation Programme lacked longitudinal data on
incomes (apart from the follow-up to Rowntree’s 1950 study led by Professor Tony
Atkinson). There are now more longitudinal data available and researchers can use the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) – Britain’s panel survey with a nationally
representative sample, which started in the autumn of 1991.
The research programme using BHPS addresses the following questions:
- How much income mobility is there in the UK?
- Do the poor remain poor?
- What accounts for the movements at the bottom?
There is a lot of mobility from one year to the next, mostly short distance. The poor do not
generally remain persistently poor, but there is a lot of ‘churning’ in and out of poverty.
‘Income’ was defined as the variable used in most British discussions about household
welfare, net household income from the labour market, returns from savings, deducting
income taxes and national insurance, and adjusted for household size.
Looking at the data from the first four waves of BHPS, little changed in distribution from a
cross sectional point of view. There is cross sectional stability but there is a lot of
longitudinal flux. How much income mobility was there? A lot, but only a short distance:
• Only 40% of the population are in the same tenth of the income distribution from one
year to the next, but over 70% remain in the same income band, one higher or one
lower.
• To discover if inequalities in the cross-section matter, we need to look at the longer-
term picture – longitudinal averaging smoothes out transitory variations and reveals
‘permanent’ income. Inequality falls as incomes from more waves are added in.
However, the fall in inequality is not so great. The ‘Gini coefficient’ inequality
measure falls from 30.9 for Wave 1 to 29.4 for Waves 1 and 2 combined, and to 27.8
for the first five waves combined. This 3 percentage point fall in the index from 5 year
averaging can be compared with the 10 point rise in the Gini coefficient in the 1980s. It
is roughly equivalent to the effect of direct taxation.
The data suggest that income mobility is slightly greater than wage mobility. Income
mobility is larger for the elderly – we cannot explain this and the reasons for it are unclear.
We would expect the reverse given the nature of income sources of elderly people.
Poverty (low income) dynamics
The low income cut-off is taken as 50% of wave 1 average net income. Few people are
persistently poor – 4.3% are ‘poor’ at every wave from 1 to 4. These are particularly the
9elderly, single parents etc. Many more people are ‘touched’ by poverty over a period than
are poor at a point in time. Almost one third have low incomes at least once over the four
year period.
The data show important changes in ‘exit’ and ‘re-entry’ rates for those who stay in or
‘escape’ low income:
Exit rate Re-entry rate
After 1 year 0.54 0.29
After 2 years 0.51 0.11
We need to combine information about exit and re-entry rates – only taking account of
exits is not good enough. We need to look at the “churning” effect or potential cycles of
disadvantage. We may be seeing a paradigm shift – we are moving away from thinking in
terms of a stock of long-term dependence towards looking at flows of people moving in
and out of poverty. One can talk of the “rubber band” model of income determination.
Most people move along the income line only within the scope allowed by their rubber
band. For some, the rubber band breaks (e.g. death of a partner or entrepreneurs going
bust) and income changes are much larger.
Discussion
• Incomes were viewed as an escalator going up and down. Although it is difficult to
track, raw correlation suggests that if a person has been ‘down’ before, they are more
likely to go ‘down’ again.
• Those most at risk of persistent poverty are single parents, women and elderly
pensioners.
• The rate of movement was greater towards the top and the bottom. At the top
income fluctuates due to the nature of income sources, for example, returns from
investment. There are also measurement errors that can cause fluctuations. There are also
age variations.
• The researchers were currently examining how much change in income is related to
change in household composition. Escape from low income is associated with gaining an
earner and more demographic stability. Entry into low income is associated with losing an
earner and also losing adults.
• The numbers in the sample were too small to say whether re-partnering was the
main way out of low income for lone parents.
• Mobility patterns looked similar for gross and net income, so the tax and benefit
system made fluctuations smaller rather than ‘tethering’ their income firmly.
• It was suggested that it was encouraging that the research indicated that relatively
few people are permanently poor, but that the ‘rubber band’ model was discouraging.
People need jobs to escape poverty but it is essential to consider the quality of the match
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for long-term escape. Data from other longitudinal surveys showed that for those with
minimal qualifications, the ‘rubber band’ preventing permanent escape is very strong.
3. Movements on and off benefits
Professor Robert Walker
(Centre for Research in Social Policy, Loughborough University)
Over longer periods of observation, we find more people in poverty, and they will
increasingly rely on benefits. Over a 3-year period, 15% of people may receive Income
Support whereas only 9% will be claimants at any one moment. The more people come
within benefits, the more benefits do for people, the wider the constituency in support of
benefits.
Long-term claimants build up in the caseload and the characteristics of the caseload
increasingly come to reflect the long-term claimants. For instance, Family Credit – an in-
work benefit – started as a bridge into work, but over time it becomes a kind of wage
subsidy. But the majority only claims it for a short period.
Poor and non-poor groups are not discrete. We have to focus on transitions and reasons for
transitions. What policies help these transitions?
Research in Loughborough had looked at a sample of people claiming Income support (IS)
between 1990 and 1993. Unemployment doubled from 5.5% to over 10% from 1990-1993.
The IS caseload increased – 59% of entrants had lost their jobs (of which 17% were at the
end of fixed term contracts). In 1991 there were larger flows of people into than out of the
system. The change in unemployment equals the balance of flows in and flows out. 4%
suffered adverse changes in their health; 7% retired. Only 1 in 4 of those becoming
unemployed went onto Unemployment Benefit. Only 1 in 5 entered Income Support via
Unemployment Benefit – a very different pattern from continental Europe. 10% of people
becoming unemployed did not receive any benefits – this may be due to redundancy
payments.
1 in 5 people were looking after a home, most of these were women. Two fifths came onto
IS because both they and their partner lost their jobs.  Therefore this suggests that some
people whose partners lose their job also stop working. However, an important new finding
was that as many partners started jobs when partners lost them as gave up jobs.
Where did people who left Income Support go? They generally follow the route back to
where they were before. 27% left benefit but did not work – they were still unemployed.
7% were looking after their home. 2% retired. 3% were suffering from long term sickness.
In the mid 1990s spells on benefits were generally not long. People also return to benefits.
25% of people return to the labour market within six weeks. 50% of people return within
14 weeks. But the escape is not necessarily permanent; 1 in 5 have returned to benefit
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within one year. More lone parents had also returned within the space of a year. There is a
lot of churning within the system.
What enables some to leave and why do some not get to leave? Factors which reduce time
on IS include:
- Degree, ‘A’ levels and a HNC or equivalent – academic qualifications make a real
difference, but vocational qualifications do not;
- Work experience;
- Driving licence/telephone (employers may demand these as part of the job, or these
may help as tools in the job search process);
- Women move off more quickly than men.
Attitudes are important – there is a new moralism in the political debate. There is a feeling
that ‘self improvement’ has been weakened. The unemployed do look for work and are
flexible in what they look for. Life on benefits is not congenial – it is stigmatising and you
may leave having debts.
Limits to work – structural constraints:
- Labour demand – the ‘missing guest at the feast’;
- Informal networks are important; people get jobs through the people they know;
- Disincentives;
- Uncertainty – being on benefits is a risky situation – taking a job may be even more
risky;
- Benefit design.
There is a set of obstacles that prevent transition from benefits into work. Policy could
build a bridge over these obstacles. The task for researchers is to learn about transitions
and triggers to change, and should suggest to policy makers ways of preventing such
obstacles.
Discussion
• Having a degree or ‘A’ Levels was important in determining the speed of re-
employment. The extent to which lower qualifications helped people back into
employment depended on the sub-group they were in. Higher qualifications were more
critical than lower levels (although results from a larger survey suggest that lower level
qualifications do help). People with degrees have an advantage. There are also gender
differences – for women, holding a higher level qualification is like a passport for long
term stability. For men this is less important.
• The unemployed were tapping into a certain sector of the labour market which
contained many short term and temporary jobs. This would be a huge hurdle for the
New Deal.
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• Other research suggested that couples are trying to be flexible (e.g. a man stays at
home and looks after the children and the wife looks for work) but are often frustrated
by the inflexibility of the Job Seeker Allowance rules (which say that it is the man who
should look for work). The researchers interviewed couples whose strategy was for one
partner to look for work rather than both. The propensity to go back onto benefits was
higher among couples where only one partner was working. Traditional one-earner
couples were more vulnerable in advance to what happens when they hit benefits.
People carry on their past norms of behaviour into the benefits system. Benefits do not
necessarily shape their behaviour.
• The study had found that two-thirds of people thought they needed to work on the side
but very few people did so. Official participants thought that this might be due to many
of these people denying that they were working for fear of being identified. Professor
Walker suggested that there had been a change over the last 10-15 years, with more
now likely to see ‘working on the side’ as legitimate. Qualitative research picks up
more actual work than quantitative surveys, but it also demonstrates the barriers;
contacts are needed to get even casual work, even if skills are not. The Loughborough
researchers followed the unemployed for 9 months – 4.7% were sanctioned by the
unemployment system, half said unfairly. 90% of the unemployed saw a need for
sanctions against working whilst claiming benefits – all the unemployed are tainted by
the same brush of cheating.
• Professor Walker reported that analysis of the sample suggested that housing tenure
was not important once other factors were taken into account. This was queried by
another academic participant who suggested that there was a link between
homeownership and length of time in unemployment. Research undertaken by
University of Glasgow suggests that lots of homeowners do not claim benefits and go
back to work very quickly. There is now a record number of owner occupiers within
the benefits system. The unemployment trap is worst where people are on Income
Support to pay their mortgage interest.
• It was asked whether self-employment is an important route out of unemployment.
Nobody who was self-employed before became employees – they went back to being
self-employed. This is linked to risk – people may be risk averse – and risks are
multiplied for the self-employed.
• The reasons for going back onto benefits were discussed – did people return to
unemployment because of the type of work they were doing, or because they simply
cannot hold down a job? Most people returning to the labour market were offered fixed
term employment. It was thought people might require more support – for instance,
some form of mentoring - after returning to work.
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4. Family Forms and Intergenerational Links
Dr Kathleen Kiernan
CASE, London School of Economics
This presentation examined two themes: early parenthood and the legacy of parental
divorce, using longitudinal data from the National Child Development Study (NCDS – a
cohort study of people born in one week in 1958).
Teenage motherhood
The higher incidence of teenage motherhood in Britain may form part of the explanation as
to why British lone mothers are more likely to be living in poverty compared with lone
mothers in other West European countries. In Britain 44% of never-married lone-mothers
and 31% of separated/divorced lone mothers had their first child in their teens. This
compares with 15% of married mothers. The evidence below shows that teenage mothers
are the ones who have accumulated the least human capital on their way to adulthood and
thus are less likely to be self-sufficient if they become lone mothers. The UK has the
highest teenage fertility rate in Europe and the rates have not altered over the last 15 years.
Teenage parents are more likely to: experience unemployment; be reliant on benefits;
experience homelessness; and have large families themselves (20% of NCDS teenage
mothers had 4 or more children by age 33).
Who becomes a teenage mother?
- those who themselves had a teenage mother (one in four compared to one in eight);
- those with a low socio-economic status;
- women who have performed less well at school, and left with no qualifications;
- they are twice as likely to have achieved poor reading and math scores. Six out of ten
had no qualifications by age 23, compared to 23% of women who had babies later;
- those who experienced emotional problems while growing up;
- those who expressed a preference at 16 for marrying and starting a family (but only 1
in 4 planned their pregnancy; equally only 1 in 4 were using any kind of
contraception).
Estimated probabilities of teenage motherhood: Putting together five different risk factors
(educational scores below median level, high emotional scores, had a teenage mother
themselves, had suffered financial hardship at age 7 or 16, and wanted an early birth) the
probability of becoming a teenage mother was 56% of those affected by all five factors,
compared to 3% for those affected by none (and 11% if affected by all except low
education).  An improving school record was linked to decreasing probability of becoming
a teenage mother. The analysis pointed to a group of underachieving girls who are at a
greater risk of becoming single parents. This group can now be more systematically
identified at an early time through school test scores, and appropriate action could be
taken.
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Legacy of parental divorce
Studies using longitudinal data point to the idea that long before parents’ divorce, there are
observable differences in the behaviour of their children. There are also factors that affect
children long after the divorce. These can have an impact upon socio-economic attainment,
demographic behaviour and mental health.
Children whose parents separate are likely to:
- have a lower educational attainment;
- have a lower income in adulthood;
- have more unemployment;
- have less prestigious jobs.
However, some of these links between divorce and poor socio-economic outcomes become
much weaker when pre-divorce conditions are taken into account. For instance, financial
stress in childhood is associated with much of the lower educational attainment and male
unemployment. But the poorer demographic outcomes cannot be explained in this way.
Even controlling for pre-divorce conditions, children from divorced families were more
likely to form partnerships earlier and start sexual relations earlier. They were more likely
to have children during teenage years themselves, and to experience partnership
breakdown themselves.
Discussion
• The US debate about teenage fathers focuses on the lack of eligible males, and men
lacking a role in life. The characteristics of men becoming fathers are the same as the
women. There is an age gap when US teenage mothers marry - the difference in age of the
teenage mother and spouse is 10 years – this could mean that young women are looking
outside their cohort for long term partners. However, UK research suggests only a 2 year
age difference.
• There are difficulties in using cohort surveys – there has been a shift in attitudes
towards single parenthood and teenage pregnancy since the 1958 cohort was growing up.
Official participants were worried about the conclusions that can be drawn from such
surveys. However, Dr Kiernan pointed out that very similar results were found in the 1946
cohort, suggesting stability in the relationships, and other participants pointed to similar
findings for the 1970 cohort (where prevalence was different, but the processes were
similar).
• 80% of teenage mothers have their baby outside marriage and/or without a partner.
The factors associated with having a baby have not changed from the earlier cohort.
• It was suggested that the value and purpose of pregnancy had different roles for
fathers and mothers. There is a rational choice to be made between the labour market and
an identity as a mother. For teenage men, becoming a father perpetuates adolescence – for
mothers it propels them into adulthood. Young fathers are much less likely to be involved
with their families, therefore being a father is less salient for them.
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• Conception and pregnancy need to be separated. People make their decisions about
work versus having a baby after they become pregnant. There is a need for intervention
before they get pregnant in terms of conception; the ones who do not conceive are those
who talk to their mothers and/or are taught about contraception at school.
• The level of basic skills was seen as being important. Those who have low basic
skills are more likely to have children during their teenage years. There needs to be
intervention to raise skills levels. Also comparing the 1958 cohort at age 23 and 33, it was
only those with some qualifications to start with who had upgraded their skills by age 33.
• Lone parenthood is now seen as a social problem – single parents are a much more
residualised group. Being without a partner is a more unstable structure. Most young
people are shifting up their child rearing and marriage into their late twenties.
• It was very difficult for researchers to ask if young mothers regretted their teenage
pregnancy. They do not regret having their baby, but they may regret not having a partner.
A PSI study on how lone parents feel about their children suggests that they feel very
positive about them.
• There is less teenage pregnancy and less divorce in Europe. The trends varied
between the Southern, Northern and Eastern regions of Europe. In southern Europe the
response to unemployment is not to have a baby. In Britain, it is.
• Another recent study had looked at women getting awards to enable them to return
to higher education. The group is not representative but throws light on what is going on -
a number of these were teenage mothers. Important factors for women leaving the
education system early included poor teaching at schools and major family upsets. Having
a child gave them a time to ‘invest in themselves’. Being a mother could be good for self-
esteem. Having a partner was not always useful. For some women returning to education,
there was an ‘Educating Rita’ effect, leading to problems with their partners involving
break-up and disruptive behaviour.
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5. Policy and Changing Family Forms
Professor Jane Millar
Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Bath
Current trends are rising divorce rates (from 5.9 to 13.4 per 1000 from 1971 to 1995/6) and
increasing numbers of births outside marriage (from 8% to 36%). There has been a rapid
change over the last twenty years. There is a greater risk of poverty for lone parents, and
therefore also the children in those households – 60% of lone parents and their children
have below half average income. Apart from elderly women, they are the group most likely
to be persistently poor.
These changes raise strong anxieties:
- about what governments can and should do about these changes
- how far has government policy reinforced or encouraged these changes
There are no simple left/right government answers to these questions. Both the
Conservative and Labour parties see strong families as re-enforcing community.
Relationships between parents and children: children are often seen as the victims of the
selfish behaviour of adults and there is concern about the long-term impact upon children.
This depends upon a multiplicity of factors. It is difficult to single out divorce or separation
from other factors. There is much less research on the long-term consequences of child
poverty.
Relations between women and men: Some argue that state benefits give women the ability
to choose to live without men. Men may be seen by some women as superfluous to family
life, but it is difficult for research to unpack this.
There is confusion over the use of the word ‘single’ – many ‘single’ women are cohabiting
and separate later. Only half of ‘single’ parents have never lived with a partner. An
important change from the past is the decline in ‘shot-gun weddings’, followed by divorce.
These mothers previously showed up as ‘divorced’, but are now counted as single. McKay
& Rowlingson (1998) divide single parents into two groups –those who have never lived
with a partner and those who did live with a partner at some point. Solo women are more
likely to come from a low socio-economic group and live in poor housing. They did not
plan to become pregnant but they did not necessarily see it as a problem. Singleness was
better than being with a partner who would have been a poor one.
Looking at separated women:
- the decision to separate was not taken lightly;
- it is not always the woman choosing to separate, but they do not necessarily regret the
separation;
- partnerships were often perceived as unequal: there was an aspiration to an equal
partnership, but the reality turned out to be different.
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Marriage is seen as a partnership to which men and women contribute equally. Some argue
that lone parenthood could be reduced if you make men more ‘eligible’ by enhancing their
breadwinner status. But women are saying that they want not so much breadwinners, but
rather equality in partnerships.
Policy responses
The focus on single parents as a group should be scrapped and replaced with a dynamic
analysis across the life cycle of the family. Lone parenthood is part of a much wider set of
family changes – cohabitation, birth outside marriage, re-partnering and step parenthood.
Lone parents are not homogenous – they are a dynamic group. Eventually they will all get
out of this status – their kids will grow up. Lone parenthood is not a permanent status, it is
a life course stage, but with particular pressures and needs.
The focus on lone parents is unhelpful and leads to negative representations. They are
stigmatised and portrayed as a threat to society, as being selfish and acting against their
children’s’ interests. The capacity to recognise positive aspects of parenthood is often
forgotten. In some other countries, for example, Denmark there is no focus on single
parents as a special group – there is a focus on single earner households (not necessarily
single parents). This enables single parents to get access to proper benefits. The
international evidence is that lone parents do better in countries where they are treated in
the same way as other lower income families.
The key area is children and the needs of children:
- we have high child poverty rates
- policy is failing children
- we need to review the nature and level of support for children
Australia and Canada are moving towards integrated systems of support for children. The
UK needs an integrated system for children, payable to families in and outside work on the
lines of the system recommended by the Finer Committee. We need to think dynamically
as single parenthood being a stage in the life cycle. We need to shift the focus on to
children.
Discussion
• Length of lone parenthood varies but all lone parents have a higher chance of being
poor and staying poor. On re-partnering, it depends on who they re-partner with that
determines the effect upon their level of poverty. Re-partnering with an unemployed
person may lead to a worse condition.
• Official participants asked if lone parents with children over age 5 should be
required to seek work. Professor Millar replied that the voluntary element is important.
Child care, wage levels and attitudes about lone mothers working are important. All these
factors play a part, but they all interact. There needs to be individual support for individual
needs. Some come forward very ready to be employed, others are less ready. The New
Deal has to regain lost trust from the last government. It has to be seen as something that
can help people and benefit them.
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• It was suggested that a focus solely on socio-economic group was a limiting factor
in tackling disadvantage. Policy makers and researchers needed to look at wider variations,
for example, rural versus urban differences.
• Local variation should be allowed to operate in the New Deal.
• The extent to which lone mothers were actually alone varies. It is much more likely
that they will be living alone than in the past. This is important in determining the extent of
poverty.
• Quality of life studies show that work is important in giving lone mothers contact
and networks with adults. Recent research by Michael Young suggested that current local
authority housing allocations policies separate single parents from potential networks of
support. Sons’ and daughters’ allocations polices had been abandoned by local authorities
but this removed potential support from grandparents.
• There are marked variations in availability of housing. In northern England, it may
be possible that single parents are re-housed close to their parents. This is made possible by
elastic supply.
• The average time women take to commute is the same for council estate dwellers as
for owner-occupiers. Local government housing policy has led to concentrations of lone
parents – they are housed in poor estates with poor transport. The mechanics of getting to
work and getting children to school are difficult – arranging your life is much more
complex.
• Poor health outcomes are associated with teenage motherhood, including links to
smoking. Poverty is associated with poor health for children. This may be a problem
associated with all young parenting, not just single young parenting.
• An integrated benefits system for children would help to reduce risks. Policies for
women - and not just families - are important. Women need a sense of control and
independence. Women going back into partnership after single parenthood go back with
much more control. They seek much more equitable relationships.
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6. Social Exclusion and Poor Neighbourhoods
Dr Anne Power
CASE, London School of Economics
1. Wider pressures on areas
The underlying problems are:
- global job pressures and de-skilling;
- family change and increasing lone parenthood
- migration;
- individualism which butts up against collective responsibility.
Changes in work have led to a loss of role in life for young men. They have been pushed
into a marginal position and they are less motivated to work at school. The young men that
fail often challenge authority and end up truanting or being excluded. ‘Rumbling disorders’
have occurred over time in a number of areas. Riots seem to follow a ‘staircase of
escalation’:
Territorial
struggle
Clamp down Intervention
Clashes
Challenge to
authority
Weak police
Reactive
protection
Alternative
‘leadership’
Reckless,
aggressive, law
breaking
minority
Exclusions
Young men
- school
failure
- loss of role
Loss of
rationale
Joblessness
De-skilling
Low income
work changes
2. Why estates matter?
- 17m households live in estates in Northern Europe;
- there are 5.5 million units in the UK alone;
- they are a huge public investment – they will not be built again;
- there are increasing pressures on people at the bottom;
- there is fear of an underclass developing
- across Europe there is evidence of viability – if something is done, conditions do
improve.
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3. Range of management approaches to urban problems:
USA
Hands off approach
Abandonment and ghettos
UK & Ireland
Strong political ownership
Weak bureaucratic management
Intense welfare decline
Continental Europe
Indirect political ownership
Strong management
Quick rescue
In US cities like Milwaukee, the ghetto has spread widely from its original core over the
1980s. If we allow this to happen here, there would be a massive increase in marginal
estates. There is already a very big gap between local authority area unemployment rates
and levels on marginal estates. This is also true for rates of single parenthood and school
performance – 5 times the proportion of children leave school with no qualifications in the
most marginal estates compared with the average. There are similar patterns of
unemployment, concentrations of empty properties and empty units on unpopular estates in
many European countries.
4. Lessons from Europe (see Estates on the Edge, Power 1997)
• estates were built as dormitories for people in work with low incomes, but they house
the unemployed; they need much more varied uses and facilities as a result;
• A social mix on estates is essential to the viability of social organisation, shops and
public transport;
• Social buffers – schools, policing, shops, voluntary organisations are all important;
• Estates need revenue funding for rescue programmes and long-term management -
capital improvements by themselves are likely to fail;
• Revenue resources need to be directed to the front-line;
Swimming against the tide or dangerous disorder?
If landlords invest revenue from rents into running an estate it is sometimes possible to
change their trajectories. But there are strong unchangeable factors such as the physical
structure and location of estates and difficult to change elements such as government
policy.
Discussion
• Dr Power argued that local authority ownership of housing created some
difficulties. Originally they were supposed to have passed on their housing ten years after
it was built. Now they are heavily involved and it is difficult to extricate them. She would
adopt a radical strategy and thought that until this was put in motion public housing would
not get the continual re-investment it needs, rather than occasional government rescue
programmes.
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• Another academic participant argued that researchers need to understand more
about the importance of concentration effects. An understanding of the way they ratchet
together is essential – this constitutes a set of factors that are over and above the
characteristics of people who are there. Even if it were possible to change the people who
lived there, conditions would remain the same.
• It was suggested that riots occurring in estates in the US in the early 1960s were
riots of rising expectations; by the 1990s people had given up hope (although the Los
Angeles riots were given as a counter example). Was the position similar in the UK? Dr
Power said that the majority of riot areas had many government programmes, but they
lacked the revenue-funded on-site management that all housing needs. The European case
studies went through rapid decline over 10 years. Rescue programmes took between 2 and
5 years to have an impact. Evidence from the UK shows that if you take attention off an
estate it begins to decline again. What is missing is hands-on multi-faceted control.
• It was pointed out that no riots occurred in Scotland, even though unemployment
there had reached the same levels as on the 13 estates in the Dangerous Disorder study at
the beginning of the 1980s
• Official participants asked if there was a view of what an estate adds to the
characteristics of the people living in them? If something is happening to the people, is
there an alternative strategy to address concentrations of poverty (i.e. change policy to
avoid concentrating vulnerable people in the same estates)? Or do we just manage them
better? Dr Power replied that there are area effects, but there are so many interacting
variables that it is difficult to separate them out. For example, a poor school damages the
people in the area. Services interact with people. We are witnessing the ‘double
disadvantage of the weak’ – concentrating poor people in areas where other people think
they cannot succeed and so leave. A large, privately owned estate in Cologne began to
improve when management became tough on criminals who had moved in when void
levels increased. Estates are not prisons, therefore  – it is important to find ways of curbing
anti-social behaviour to avoid inflicting the consequences on vulnerable communities.
• Accessing employment is an essential part of tackling social disadvantage on
estates. Landlords and other local services do not have control over local labour markets,
but they can play a role by employing tenants to do many of the jobs that have to be done
at estate level.
• Some researchers suggested that it was important to take account of the huge
variations in the quality of estates within the council sector. Researchers need to examine
the trajectories of different types of estates, not just the worst ones. We also need to look at
variations within estates. More sophisticated and detailed studies are needed.
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7. Crime & Drugs: Continuity, Change & Transmission
Professor Geoffrey Pearson
Department of Community Studies, Goldsmiths College
The way society complains about crime is very static. Discourses seem incapable of
keeping up with change (Pearson, 1983). Between 1981-1995 violent crime rose by 65%,
and acquisitive crime by 109% (more than half of the increase is attributed to auto thefts)
while vandalism remained static, which is in some ways puzzling  (British Crime Survey,
1996).
Crime and deprivation
Geographical consistency over time in areas of deprivation, crime and drug use - in the
1920s and 30s, Chicago’s inner city contained dense concentrations of young delinquents.
The use of opium was also concentrated there. Heroin use patterns in the 1960s would
follow similar patterns.
Using British Crime Survey data and the ACORN model of classifying neighbourhoods,
criminologists have identified concentrations of crime in particular areas; half of
neighbourhoods in the country account for 85% of victimisation; one tenth account for
30% of crime. There is a high level of crime in poor areas but people living there often
have no insurance. People in more affluent areas have less fear of crime – they are more
likely to be insured.
Drugs
Research from the north of the USA indicates that drug problems are concentrated in poor
areas. Research in the UK also reflects this. For example, there is a high use of Class A
drugs in north Lewisham where you can also find the highest concentrations of social
problems. Why does this clustering occur? Why should we find single parent households,
marginal people, old people and heroin addicts all together? The housing market seems to
fuel these ‘urban clustering’ effects (Pearson and Gilman, 1994).
‘Normalisation’ of drug use; Surveys of drug consumption indicate that between 40-50%
of young people self report having used drugs. Between 40-50% of whites and Afro-
carribeans have used drugs, while only between 10-15% of Asians report drug use, despite
the poverty in these families. This is possibly due to strong social control in Asian
communities. However, surveys invariably ask ‘Have you ever used drugs?’ This is not a
useful question – we need more precision and more detailed information on drug using
careers – how they got in, how they get out. We also need to know about family processes
and patterns that protect against risk factors, and peer effects outside families. Parenting
skills teaching needs to begin in early childhood, otherwise the influence of peers may
override parental influence. Not enough attention has been paid to how people get out of
drug use.
USA drug use researchers have taken a sample of arrested people (for a wide range of
crimes, not just drug related) who are asked to complete a questionnaire and give a urine
sample. The ‘DUF’ data produced enables us to follow trends. In New York the result used
to be that 70% of people in the sample had recently used cocaine. Cocaine use is now
dropping among young people in a number of US cities, to as low as 10-15% – people
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have seen the damage it has done to their parents and their brothers. This is one of the few
pieces of ‘good news’ in recent years in the drugs field (Golub and Johnson, 1997). This
has been accompanied by a decline in violent crime and homicide rates. There is much
debate as to whether the fall in crime is due to zero tolerance or declining cocaine use
(Butterfield, 1997).
Crime, drugs and deprivation are inextricably linked at local levels and driven by the
housing market. The field of drugs is complex – we need a local focus, rather than the
national picture. We also need to focus on serious misuse rather than recreational use.
Families are an important influence, but peer groups are more important. USA research
suggests that to tackle drug misuse, more money should be invested in health care. Most
impressive in this respect is the RAND model for cocaine control which compares costs
and benefits from different interventions: source-country control programmes; border
interdiction; domestic enforcement; and treatment (Everingham and Rydell, 1994). In
brief, to obtain the same goal of a 1 per cent reduction in cocaine consumption it is
estimated that this would cost $783 million for source-country control, $336 million for
interdiction, $246 million for domestic enforcement, or $34 million for treatment. Put
another way, the savings created by supply-control programmes are smaller than the
control costs. The savings involved in the reduction of social costs (crime etc.) resulting
from cocaine misuse are as follows for every dollar spent: 15 cents for source-country
programmes; 32 cents for interdiction; 52 cents for domestic enforcement; and $7.46 for
treatment.
Discussion
• An official participant asked why young people were turning away from drugs, and
did this rejection ‘just happen’ or was it to do with public health intervention. Did we just
have to wait for the penny to drop and would things get much worse before they get better?
Professor Pearson replied that declining crack use in USA has had little to do with public
health campaigns. The messages were not getting through. The peak year for US overall
cocaine consumption was 1977/8 – the trend has been downward as more people turn away
from cocaine. One may just have to wait for the penny to drop. When it came, the turning
point was very fast – drug use was associated with guns and homicide – because so many
young people died, it was such a powerful message. Violence was dealer related, but its
very much about local experiences, which are largely uncontrollable.
• North British cities are different – in the south you do get concentrations. In the
north you get poor people and empty dwellings – when drug dealers move in they can
destabilise a whole estate within 3-6 months – this can increase turnover very quickly. The
police would rather go after the big boys, but failing to tackle drug use at micro level does
great damage to estates. The divisions between crime, drugs and housing programmes are
very difficult – this is a problem for the Social Exclusion Unit.
• Another participant pointed to the UK epidemic of property crime. However,
epidemics kill off their hosts and so are eventually self-limiting. An increase in offending
leads to a change in victim behaviour. It is not clear how the segregation between rich and
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poor areas is linked to crime. In the ESRC Crime and Social Order Programme, adjacent
estates in Salford were studied. One was deteriorating, but in the other, order had re-
emerged – but only after accommodating to powerful groups. Issues for policy were:
- If material circumstances improve, will crime wither away?
- Or is there still ‘slack’, implying that extra measures are needed to take out a minority
of criminals?
- Crime and drugs are themselves a barrier to getting the structure right.
• The value of the current fashion for parenting as a solution was questioned.
Professor Pearson pointed to David Farrington’s work arguing for investment in parenting
skills as part of crime reduction, but he himself was sceptical about the value of parenting
skills. The drug issue is undeniably new – outside London heroin use was virtually
unknown until the 1980s. Maybe 12% of burglaries are heroin related – the most careful
study estimates that, on the basis of different assumptions, between 1% and 21% of the
costs of acquisitive crime were heroin related, or between £58 million and £864 million
(ISDD, 1994). But the data are poor; Britain has to start testing on American lines – this is
a much better measure than self-reporting. We now have a pilot study of urine testing
along similar lines to the US DUF programme, see Bennett, 1998).
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8. Report back
Three of the official participants then summarised what seemed to them to be the key
points emerging from the preceding sessions.
a) Income and benefit mobility
Social Exclusion cuts across policy boundaries. Links between research evidence and
where DSS policy is coming from are essential.
The latest Loughborough research that suggests that if one partner loses work then the
other often goes out and gets work. This implies that maybe we need to be more flexible
about who goes out and looks for work. Or maybe both partners should! We also need to
understand the importance of measures of not only income, but also consumption and
expenditure.
The steers from Ministers are that work, education and training are the way forward. This
is consistent with evidence presented on the relevant factors on mobility. But the evidence
on ‘churning’ shows that people may not move far. This does not invalidate the New Deal,
but there is a risk associated with work – we have to balance work experience with skills
acquisition.
A lot of benefits go to people who are outside the labour market e.g. they have effectively
retired. Only a one third of people who received income support for mortgage interest are
currently in the labour market – others are long term sick or old.
We need to look at tapers. Modifying tapers has ambiguous effects on the poverty trap and
is expensive. The earnings/income disregard is expensive and has a dead weight cost. Lack
of knowledge by claimants of how the system works is important in thinking about reform.
There is no pressure from Ministers to raise general benefit levels, as spending is seen as
untargeted and the effects of general increases too slow. We are bound to look at targeting.
A lot of what happens on the ground may be to do with doubts about what happens when
you move into and out of benefits. DSS are looking into piloting localisation of benefits.
There could be a bolder approach if a local office had control over its entire budget – this
might have a greater effect on how individuals actually get out of a cycle of disadvantage.
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b) Family Change and Family Policy
The Treasury is interested in cycles of disadvantage for three reasons:
1. The core aim of HMT is to raise the sustainable growth rate and opportunities  for
everyone to share in the benefits of growth;
2. Cycles of disadvantage result from multiple problems which require multiple solutions
and the Treasury cuts across sectors;
3. Substantial amounts of public expenditure are devoted to mitigating the effects of
cycles of disadvantage.
We are mid-way through the Comprehensive Spending Review. The government is taking
its time to set its priorities for the medium term – it is deciding how to spend money more
carefully in order to deliver on its promises.
Family policy -  What can government do to help break cycles of disadvantage, without
interfering in people’s lives?
- people are held back by the ‘rubber band’ syndrome – how can government help them
move up?
- How do we distinguish between cause and effect?
- There are problems with getting into peoples’ personal lives, but government is
interfering all over the place in various areas.
What are the characteristics of families in cycles of disadvantage? We know that they are
prone to single parenthood and unemployment. The New Deal will help to tackle the
problems of unemployment, but what else can be done? Is there a role for government to
look at families suffering from cycles of disadvantage in order to target help more
effectively?
The problems of families in cycles of disadvantage require multiple solutions.
Communities and local residents have a great capacity to pull themselves up given a
modest amount of government financial or other type of assistance. We need to know
about what good experience there is and how we can spread this experience.
c) Communities, Drugs and Crime
Three keys themes had been highlighted in presentations and discussions:
1. The multi-faceted nature of the problems: families, areas, peers and genes (from
Professor Rutter’s presentation);
2. The spatial dimension and impact of concentrations – the problems of people are
distilled and strengthened if you put them all together.
3. The issue of gradient – the City of Manchester is much closer to England than Hulme is
to Manchester. This is something that EU structural funds fail to capture.
We need to focus on time and movements within life cycles. How can we design policies
and timings of intervention to maximise their impact?
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- Dr Power had given the “estateist” view. DETR is also estateist, making a great deal of
use of it in Single Regeneration Budget and City Challenge. These programmes are not
just about physical renewal, but also to design out crime and promote energy
conservation – but these improvements have little impact on peoples’ disadvantage –
you also have to tackle problems in the local economy. Nor is simply bringing jobs to
the area enough by itself.
- It is harmful for so much housing to be owned by local authorities. However, there has
been limited transfer activity as tenant ballots have slowed the process down.
- Society aspires to social improvement – in health, housing, education and environment.
But crime is a conspicuous failure – crime has worsened. Cars had become a source of
rising prosperity for criminals. Perpetrators and victims of crime are living cheek by
jowel. This makes victim protection a priority.
These issues relate to DETR policies on cities – we are trying to prevent the ‘volcano’
effect of bigger and bigger cones with a bigger crater in the middle. We need to aim for
people with choices wanting to live in cities and in their particular area all their lives.
Policy follow-up is essential – we need to get people into jobs – we have to follow up the
housing questions, including the question have we allowed housing to decline then put in
emergency programmes to rescue it instead of investing in it. We need to start treating
council housing as an asset.
We also need to examine:
- what we can do to buttress community leaders
- the role of local authorities. We are trying to help them improve, but they need to let
community leaders have their say as well.
Discussion
• The research evidence that had been presented was impressive, particularly the
schematic understanding of the transitions of individuals, communities and estates. It was
important to examine how well this research engages with policy makers. Policy makers
and academics needed to be on the on the same level. Researchers needed to conceptualise
the ‘churning’ and ‘rubber band’ approaches; there was a need for ‘big thought’ on social
stratification. In comparative research, and there was a need for further examination into
the reasons for differences on rates of teenage pregnancies.
• How do we know what works and what doesn’t work? How do we re-tool to learn
from and analyse policy? An important area of methodological thought is how we can
evaluate local policies and initiatives.
• The reason why localisation and linkage to the wider economy determines why an
estate becomes viable is partly due to resources. But also if people on the ground are not
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involved in the rescue programme then it is likely to fail. If an area is bad, people who
have choice will leave, and vulnerable people will come in. We are asking vulnerable
people to re-double their efforts to make the areas succeed. Does the pig make the sty?  Is
it the building type that creates poor conditions or is it the people? The USA view is that it
is the people so support is cut. In Europe the view is that the building type has caused the
problems, so we have put in support on a localised model. Residents face huge barriers to
change and they are best placed to break them down. Supporting parents makes a big
difference in their performance as parents. There is a lot more promise in people-focused
schemes than those without the people element. The National Tenants Resource Centre has
run training programmes for 5000 tenants. Most programmes are targeted on young people.
• When looking at solutions to drug misuse on estates it is very tempting to resort to
eviction. People in areas who do not use drugs have rights too – they need systems of
defence. The Phoenix Trust is engaged in intensive housing management solutions,
working closely with tenant drug users - sometimes this approach works but not always.
• We have a unique opportunity now that we have a Government that believes it can
do things to achieve a positive change. Most people are working hard to succeed.
Government should recognise and support this.
• We are now discussing how the government can intervene and give sustained
support to tackle some of the problems we have been discussing. One approach is one-to-
one support – we need to find a way to make this work – people on the receiving end of
seemingly workable policies react with fear because they do not understand the
assumptions behind them. We need to look at which things work well and in which
context.
• We need more research on links between policy, attitudes and behaviour. A lot
relates to choice, being in work or on benefits and about parenthood. There are problems
with a ‘do-it-yourself’ welfare state if people get it wrong.
• Looking at ‘problems’ is often not very helpful. Family literacy programmes show
that motivation is often the solution to getting people involved. If you pull certain triggers
people will do all kinds of things. In France and Scandinavia, social exclusion would be
seen as a breakdown in the contract between state and individual.. People have to take
responsibility for their lives. Social exclusion is more than disadvantage – it is also about
lack of engagement.
• Research has explored reactions to youth justice and social inclusion/exclusion.
This highlights the crucial importance of local institutional structures – the ‘conduit’ for
resources downwards and for democratic voice upwards. This has got lost in the quasi-
market delivery of resources.
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9. Social Exclusion, Research Inputs and Research Needs
Moira Wallace
Social Exclusion Unit, Cabinet Office
Government effort on social exclusion runs across government and does not depend solely
on the SEU. Policies to tackle social exclusion include: Welfare to Work, tax and benefits
reform, literacy and numeracy programmes and an integrated transport policy. The
government recognises the need to do more than pump departmental policies through
departmental chimneys.
We need to tackle to whole problem – this requires a multi-departmental approach. We
need to look at prevention  - we need to shift more money to prevention from mopping up
problems.
The SEU will focus on areas where it can add value; it will not try to tell departments how
to do what they already do better. We will focus on areas of interdepartmental problems.
There are difficulties where costs and benefits fall on different departments.
The SEU is attempting to turn this into a manageable work programme. We have to
maintain momentum to maintain support for the Unit – the Prime Minister has asked the
Unit to tackle some difficult questions quite quickly. The three areas of our focus in the
first six months will be:
1. School exclusions and truanting
2. Street homelessness
3. Worst estates – an integrated approach looking at the estate, the school, the jobs, crime
and drugs.
We have to get government departments working together. The theme underpinning SEU’s
work is how to integrate the work of departments with local agencies. We also need to look
at the things government does that do not help. We need to define ‘social exclusion’ and
find out how much there actually is.
For our longer-term agenda, we will be looking at young people and how we can stop them
falling off the conveyor belt. We will look at ethnic minority aspects of social exclusion,
for example, ethnic variations in school exclusions. We will look at access to services –
both public and private – and the levers of access, which are in the Government’s hands.
As part of the long-term agenda we need to look at transmission mechanisms and risk. We
have to be careful that policies are designed well. For example, school league tables were
meant to improve schools but they have led to greater exclusions.
How can we engage with research? We need to know what issues ought to be on the
agenda. What are the problems we can only just see the beginnings of? This type of forum
is useful, as we cannot read everything. It is also useful to hear academics disagreeing with
each other!
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Discussion
• The issues we have been discussing are high on the political agenda. The SEU is
one of the key institutional moves to put this agenda into action. The Government is
pragmatic and brings with it little ideological baggage, and is therefore more open to
academics’ ideas than ever before. The Downing Street Policy Unit is keen on holding
events like this one with a small group of people and a smaller focus. This is a period of
accelerating learning for the Government, but this may not last, so now is the time to have
influence over the direction of Government thinking.
• The ESRC’s Children 5-16 programme will look at a variety of related issues. This
research might not report for several years. Policy is about ‘snakes and ladders’ –
everything that policy does contains a snake and a ladder. There are choices in talking
about children and social exclusion. We can talk about children as the outcomes of social
policy. Or we can talk about them as participants in social processes. This distinction could
be important in how we translate policy into action at the local level. We can either focus
on children as a problem or as a resource. We need to know how we can harness this
resource.
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